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1.  Introduction: The Importance of Municipal Finance in Providing Infrastructure 
 
Various trends, including an increasing emphasis on fiscal decentralization; political democratization in 
many areas; globalization and the financial liberalization that often accompanies it; growing demands for 
urban services as urbanization continues in major cities around the world; all argue compellingly for 
finding ways to help municipalities finance large-scale infrastructure. Improved urban infrastructure, for 
water supply, sanitation, urban transportation and solid waste management is widely believed essential in 
encouraging and facilitating economic growth.  Evidence indicates that those countries most successful in 
sustaining high growth supported their cities with transformative investments to improve urban 
infrastructure that could accommodate rapid population growth in major economic centers. This evidence 
suggests that infrastructure has a strong “supply-side” orientation and in practice, it is the effects of 
infrastructure on “supply” that are most often emphasized. There is also a strong “demand-side” aspect: 
individuals and businesses value the services that flow from the stock of infrastructure facilities and these 
demands should be (but are often not) considered in determining the appropriate level of infrastructure 
investment.  In addition to the potential supply-and-demand-side impacts on economic growth, the 
services of infrastructure also play a significant role in the distribution of income.  
 
Although data are often limited, the extent of the infrastructure “gap” – or the amount of additional 
infrastructure spending that is needed to provide basic services – is enormous.  See Box 1 for a 




Urban infrastructure finance has multiple dimensions.  This paper focuses on a limited number of these 
dimensions: 
  Finance for major infrastructure improvements in major economic centers; 
  Finance for expansion of basic municipal services in secondary cities and towns; and 
  Intergovernmental systems for financing investments with impacts beyond jurisdictional limits. 
Box 1: The Deteriorating Quality of Infrastructure in Kenya 
  
The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) of Kenya recently concluded that the condition 
of infrastructure was the worst since independence in 1963.  Specifically, the NESC estimated that: 
  47 percent of classified roads are unserviceable and need reconstruction 
  The condition of railroads is poor, as indicated by the decline in Kenya Railways revenue 
per km-tonnage by one-third due to lack of equipment and poor maintenance 
  Kenya has the highest costs of international phone in the region, saddling Kenya Telekom 
with inefficiency and outdated technology 
  The rate of national access to clear water is only 57 percent, and to sanitation is 86 percent 
  Over two-thirds of Kenyans rely on wood fuel for energy, and only 9 percent have access to 
electricity 
  60 percent of Nairobi’s residents live in slums, and all of the major urban areas in Kenya 
exhibit a similar pattern. 
 
Source: Nabutola (2006).  
2 
 
Also included is a review of current practices, an examination of international evidence and case studies, 
and a look at areas in which knowledge gaps remain. 
 
The basic—but still quite tentative—conclusions reached in this review are: 
  The “theory” of fiscal federalism has many useful and general guidelines. However, the practical 
and specific relevance of these guidelines remains quite unclear. 
  In the specific context of municipal infrastructure finance, there is little in the theory that allows 
one to determine whether one infrastructure “scheme” is “better” than another. It remains unclear 
if one scheme could be selected in one scenario and not in another, or will “work” in one scenario 
and not in another. 
  There are numerous examples where one infrastructure scheme works in one institutional setting 
and not in another, seemingly similar, institution.  There are also many examples where countries 
with similar institutional settings follow very different paths in infrastructure finance.  The full 
effects of different schemes on service delivery, income distribution and poverty reduction are 
seldom fully quantified or understood. 
  The reasons for the differential outcomes outlined above are unclear. 
  Despite inconclusive and conflicting observations, there are avenues by which our understanding 
of infrastructure schemes can be enhanced. 
  Overall, the lack of clarity relates to limited available information, which is a serious, widespread 
challenge. 
 




2.  Dimensions of Urban Infrastructure 
 
It is useful at the start to be precise on what exactly is meant by “infrastructure”.  For purposes here, 
infrastructure will be taken to mean long-lived capital facilities used in providing certain types of services 
to households and also in providing services that enhance private sector production.  “Infrastructure” 
therefore includes services from water systems, solid waste management, sewer systems, power 
generating plants, roads, mass transportation, electricity generation, and telecommunications. 
 
Note that this definition focuses on the role of infrastructure in household consumption (e.g., water 
systems) and in business production (e.g., electricity generation).  Infrastructure has an essential role in 
both dimensions.  Note also that this definition emphasizes both the flow of services from the physical 
facility and the stock of capital that actually generates the service flow.  As noted by Fox (1994), there are 
two major advantages to focusing on the service flow rather than (exclusively) on the capital stock.  One 
is that policymakers are more likely to think flexibly about the best technology for producing the service.  
For example, policymakers may conclude that encouraging public group transportation, such as jeepneys 
in the Philippines and matatu buses in Kenya, is a better solution to transportation needs than building 
roads or constructing mass transit systems. Also, policymakers are more likely to focus on providing the 
specific services that people demand instead of looking at engineering designs for infrastructure facilities.  
Note finally that this definition does not distinguish between public versus private infrastructure.  If one 
considers separately the various functions of planning, finance, construction, ownership, operation, and 
maintenance of infrastructure, then it is not necessary for the public sector to be the sole actor in all of 
these functions; that is, there can clearly be a combined role for the public, the private, and even the not-
for-profit sectors in providing “infrastructure” and its associated services.   
 
 
3.  Infrastructure in “Theory” and in Practice: Decentralization and the Subsidiarity Principle 
 
3.1. The Theory and Rationale of Infrastructure Finance 
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In a “perfect” world, the provision of urban infrastructure – indeed, the provision of most any local 
government service – would be a simple process, and would involve the following basic considerations: 
  Determine whether the project is justified, by conducting a standard social benefit-cost analysis 
  Given the long-lived nature of the capital facilities, borrow the funds necessary to finance the 
initial infrastructure cost 
  Finance the ongoing operations and maintenance expenditures via user costs or other local 
sources of revenues. 
 
Indeed, the outcome of this process would reflect the basic, underlying rationale for fiscal decentralization 
generally and for municipal provision of capital projects specifically: the so-called Subsidiarity Principle of 
Oates (1972, 1993, 1999) and others, also sometimes referred to as the “Decentralization Theorem”.  
This principle states that government services should be provided by the lowest level of government that 
can do so efficiently.  When tastes, incomes, and needs differ across regions, local governments will be in 
the best position to determine the expenditure priorities of its citizens, and assigning responsibilities to the 
lowest level of government allows government services to be adapted more closely to the specific 
demands of local citizens.  The existence of multiple local jurisdictions also gives individuals the 
opportunity to “vote with their feet” by moving to the jurisdiction that best meets their demands for the 
appropriate mix of public services and taxes (Tiebout, 1956), at least when mobility exists.  Relatedly, 
when local governments are assigned expenditure responsibilities, they should bear the costs of financing 
those expenditures because only then will they balance the benefits of public goods with the costs.  In this 
regard, McLure (2006) has more recently suggested a revenue-side corollary to the Subsidiarity Principle, 
which extends subsidiarity from expenditure to tax assignments: taxes should be assigned to the lowest 
level of government that can collect the tax efficiently.
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International experience has shown repeatedly that these general guidelines, while useful in highlighting 
the main types of considerations, are often applied quite differently, if at all, in different countries; that is, 
there is no single “best” expenditure (and revenue) assignment.  Even so, this experience has also shown 
that it is important to have a clear and stable assignment across governments, in which the 
responsibilities of each level of government are clear and unambiguous and in which a mechanism exists 
both to coordinate provision and to resolve potential conflicts.  It is especially important to follow, where 
possible, the Subsidiarity Principle in the assignment of the allocative function of government.  Failure to 
follow these general principles typically has lead to underprovision of government services.
2  Details of 
revenue assignment and transfer design are discussed later.  
 
Of course, the conditions under which decentralization actually “works” at the local government level are 
quite stringent, and include such conditions as: 
  There must be a popularly elected local council 
  There must be locally appointed chief officials 
  There must be a locally approved budget 
  There must be an absence of central government mandates on local government decisions on 
employment and salaries 
                                                 
1  There are of course mitigating factors here, all of which argue against efficient local government provision.  For example, if a 
public good provides benefits not only locally but across jurisdictions, then a local jurisdiction may discount some of those benefits 
and under provide the good.  In this case, a higher level of government may be in a better position to provide it; alternatively, the 
central government may need to subsidize local government expenditures.  Similarly, there may be cases where services can be 
provided more efficiently at larger scales than the local jurisdiction.  An example may be municipal solid waste: even large cities may 
benefit from sharing a single landfill rather than procuring their own individually, and even small towns and villages may benefit from 
sharing a single trash collection service.  On the tax side, if a local government tries to tax a mobile factor, the factor can easily 
avoid the tax by moving outside the relevant jurisdiction, thereby leading to a loss in revenues and causing distortions in the 
economy.  Generally speaking, because it is easier for households, firms, and economic activities to move within a nation than 
across nations, factors are less mobile from the perspective of a central government than from that of a local government.  This may 
be one reason for central governments to subsidize local governments' expenditures.  Finally, local governments may interact 
strategically, competing to attract and/or hold a larger share of mobile tax bases.  This phenomenon has been characterized as a 
“race to the bottom”, as it suggests poorer quality of public services as local governments collectively cut tax rates. 
2  For example, if the responsibility for some service like infrastructure provision is not specifically assigned to any government, or if 
the same responsibility is assigned to multiple levels of government, then it is commonly the case that each level will assume – or 
argue – that it is the responsibility of the other government (s) to provide the service.  The service will then be underprovided, if 
provided at all.  
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  There must be a clear expenditure assignment 
  Local governments must be able to exert at least some control on the level of at least some 
revenue sources 
  Local governments must have some powers to borrow 
  The must be a transparent grant system, in which local governments are able to understand their 
grant entitlements 
  Local governments must have the capacity to collect taxes 
  Local governments must have the capacity to deliver services efficiently 
  Local governments must have the capacity to keep adequate books of account 
  The central government must have the ability to monitor the behaviors of local governments. 
 
These conditions help ensure that local government is responsive to the demands of local citizens.  
However, these conditions are seldom if ever met, especially in developing countries (Bahl, 1999). 
 
In the context here, if local governments are to be given more independence in their expenditure (and tax) 
decisions, then such independence should extend to their responsibility for execution of the planning, 
financing, constructing, operating, and maintaining of all capital projects in the relevant areas that have 
been assigned to them; that is, the assignment of capital expenditure responsibilities should follow the 
same criteria as the assignment of recurrent expenditure responsibilities, and for largely the same 
reasons.  Assigning capital expenditure responsibilities to the lowest level of government that can handle 
them efficiently will improve the efficiency of service delivery by making these governments more 
accountable to their citizens, subject of course to the same conditions identified earlier. 
 
Indeed, such independence should extend even to local government use of borrowing. In principle, local 
government borrowing can provide significant benefits, benefits that follow directly and immediately from 
the application of the Subsidiarity Principle to capital projects.  As noted earlier, this principle requires that 
the responsibility for government services should lie with the lowest level of government whose 
jurisdiction matches the benefit area of the service.  There is no reason why this principle should not 
apply to the services that flow from capital projects, just as the principle applies to current expenditures.  
Further, local government borrowing allows the government to align more closely current expenditures 
with current receipts, an especially important consideration in the face of temporary and unexpected 
fluctuations in revenues.  Finally, given the lumpy nature of investment projects, requiring that they be 
financed out of current revenues is likely to be inefficient and inequitable, since both current and future 
generations will benefit from capital projects that last multiple years.  In sum, the Subsidiarity Principle 
suggests that local governments should be responsible for the full range of duties associated with capital 
projects: planning, financing, constructing, operating, and maintaining. 
 
It is certainly the case that local government borrowing has sometimes created, or at least contributed to, 
significant problems.
3  These difficulties are discussed in more detail later. 
 
However, the failure to allow local governments to borrow can also lead to problems.  When local 
governments have no responsibility for the facilities, then they may find it advantageous to scrimp on 
maintenance expenditures, believing that the central government will replace existing facilities.  Put 
differently, if municipal governments do not feel “ownership” of their capital facilities, then there is a “moral 
hazard” problem because it is unlikely that they will choose to invest resources in maintaining them.  It is 
well known in public budgeting and fiscal management that replacement costs are typically a large 
multiple of funds required for maintenance and even basic rehabilitation (Willoughby, 2000).  See Box 2. 
 
 
                                                 
3  See Tanzi (1996) and Ahmad, Albino-War, and Singh (2005) for further discussion of the macroeconomic concerns stemming 
from decentralization.  See also Nicolini, Posadas, Sanguinetti, and Tommas (2002) for analysis of these issues in the specific case 






3.2 What Can Go Wrong? 
 
However, as noted, this “perfect” and “simple” scenario of infrastructure finance never exists.  Even aside 
from the failure of the various conditions for decentralization to be satisfied, what can go wrong? 
 
An obvious problem lies in difficulties in conducting benefit-cost analysis of the proposed infrastructure 
project.  The presence of multiple objectives (e.g., income distribution, correction of externalities, 
provision of public goods, equal access to services, incorporation of civil society organizations) often 
clouds the estimates.  It is difficult to estimate the social benefits of services that generate in part, say, 
positive externalities or that redistribute income.  The demand for the public services financed by 
infrastructure may be difficult to estimate because of the lack of true local accountability; that is, there 
may not an accurate demand-revealing process that operates via the political process.  There may be 
uncertainty about demand for services, both now and in the future, which makes estimation of the 
willingness to pay for services difficult.  There may also be uncertainty about costs of service provision 
(e.g., exchange risk), and uncertainty about the appropriate discount rate to apply in the analysis. 
 
Of perhaps more consequence, another problem stems from difficulties in generating borrowed funds for 
initial infrastructure costs via municipal government access to capital markets.  In most countries, 
municipal government access to credit markets is quite limited.  In part this lack of access is due to the 
non-existence of local government credit markets.  However, even where these markets exist, there is 
seldom useful and reliable information on the “creditworthiness” of local governments, via such common 
devices in developed countries of a bond-rating system.  There is frequently a lack of transparency in 
municipal government operations that contributes to this. 
 
A final problem arises due to difficulties in generating revenues for ongoing operations and maintenance 
expenditures.  In very few developing countries is there a consistent pattern of efficient cost recovery via 
user fees.  There is typically a higher ongoing cost of operations and maintenance due to municipal 
government inefficiency, including corruption and incompetence of local government officials.  The record 
of municipal governments I collecting tax revenues from “regular” sources of revenues is also quite mixed.  
The ability to generate significant amounts of revenues from “innovative” sources of revenues, including 
municipal government “assets” (e.g., land) is also limited. 
 
Box 2: Maintaining Subnational Roads in Bangladesh 
  
As part of a USAID-financed project in the early 1980s to construct roads in mainly rural areas of 
Bangladesh by the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) of the Ministry of Interior 
and Local Government, a team of economists was also asked to examine the revenue-generating 
abilities of local governments.  The intention of this part of the overall “Zila Roads Maintenance 
Project” was to improve the capacity of local governments to generate the revenues necessary to 
maintain the roads.  Otherwise, poorly maintained roads would quickly be eroded when the 
monsoons hit.  However, the roads were being built with very little input from the local governments 
who would be given maintenance responsibilities.  As a result, the local governments felt little 
ownership of the roads and so felt little incentive to maintain the roads that were being given them 
because they had little at stake in the road construction.  Despite the identification by the project of 
various means of increasing local government revenue mobilization, the local governments devoted 
little effort to road maintenance, and many of the constructed roads quickly deteriorated.   Sometime 
later, virtually the same scenario was repeated on a World Bank project to build municipal 
infrastructure, and for the same reasons. 
 
Source: Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (1997).  
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In the face of these types of difficulties with municipal government provision of infrastructure, other 
options are often suggested, including public-private partnerships, complete privatization, or privatization 
combined with government regulation, as preferred options for provision of infrastructure services.  These 
options are discussed later.  
 




4.  Potential Sources of Municipal Finance for Capital Projects 
 
Municipal governments have many potential sources of revenues to finance the initial construction of 
capital facilities and also to pay for the operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects.  These 
include: 
  Municipal government borrowing from private capital markets via bond issuance 
  Municipal government borrowing from specialized financial institutions/intermediaries 
  Taxes
4 
  User fees  
  Land- and Asset-based sources: 
o  Impact fees and development charges (e.g., developer extractions) 
o  Betterment levies (e.g., land value capture taxes) 
o  Use of municipal “assets” (e.g., land) 
o  Tax increment financing 
  Central government finance via intergovernmental transfers 
  International donors 
 
These sources can be broadly classified into three main categories: borrowing, municipal own-source 
revenues (e.g., taxes and user fees), and transfers.  Of these, some are better suited for the initial finance 




5.  Identifying “Efficient Financing” of Infrastructure 
 
It is useful in the following discussion to distinguish between the one-time finance of initial capital 
investments and the on-going finance of operation and maintenance expenditures.   Each dimension is 
discussed in turn. 
 
One especially novel method that does not fit easily into any category is “informal taxation”.   
See Box 3 for a discussion of this little-examined method of finance. 
 
 
                                                 
4 A municipal “tax” can be defined as one that satisfies the following conditions: 
  The local governments decides whether or not to levy the tax 
  The government determines the tax base 
  The government determines the tax rate 
  The government administers the tax, including assessment, enforcement, and collection 
  The government retains the revenues from the tax. 






5.1. Initial Capital Investments 
 
Municipal Government Borrowing. 
 
Municipal governments in most all countries are unable to finance initial capital investments from current 
savings, and municipal borrowing is the obvious and preferred source of financing for these investments.  
Borrowing allows local governments to better match current expenditures with current tax revenues, 
allowing temporary and unexpected swings in revenues to be smoothed without undue disruption in 
service provision.  Borrowing allows local governments to finance public capital projects that are lumpy in 
nature, and to shift some of the burden of finance to future generations that will benefit from durable and 
long-lived projects.  Most importantly, borrowing allows local governments to construct facilities that more 
closely reflect the demands of its citizens, thereby moving government “closer to the people”. 
 
In practice, there are two main types of borrowing finance.  One source comes from direct municipal 
access to capital markets via the municipal government issue of bonds.  Bond issue as the main source 
of long term capital investments by municipalities is unlikely to play a significant role given the absence of 
capital markets for which local governments have meaningful access.  Bond issue is especially unlikely 
for smaller local governments. 
 
A second source, and one that addresses to some extent municipal government access to capital 
markets, is borrowing from specialized financial institutions.  It is common in many European countries to 
create a financial intermediary (or a financial intermediation program) that allows all local governments to 
borrow conditional upon designated banking criteria.  One advantage of this approach is that these 
financial intermediaries can reduce the cost of borrowing for smaller local governments by spreading the 
risks across many governments, a practice that lowers the average costs of borrowing.  Also, it may be 
possible to combine technical development assistance with lending assistance.  A financial intermediary 
may also facilitate central government intervention through its supply of targeted investment funds.  
However, there are risks of a financial intermediation program.  The program may be susceptible to 
political biases, abuses, and corruption.  There has also often been a tendency for the central 
government to comingle a range of objectives with what should be strict lending criteria of a financial 
intermediary.  See Box 4 for some international experiences with these types of funds. 
 
 
Box 3: Informal Taxation 
 
“Informal taxation” refers to contributions made by local residents outside the formal tax system to 
the construction and maintenance of local public goods, payments that are coordinated by public 
officials but enforced largely through social customs and norms.  In fact, individuals in many 
communities throughout the developing contribute substantially local public goods such as roads 
and water systems, both in money and labor, with often complex arrangements determining how 
much each household should pay and what penalties apply for those who free ride.  These systems 
are called by many different names, such as gotong royong in Indonesia and harambee in Kenya.  
These informal payments can be quite large; they are often regressive in their pattern of incidence; 
and their form differs significantly across countries. 
 





In either case, there needs to be appropriate central government oversight and regulation of municipal 
borrowing activities, in order to ensure that standard loan practices are met.  The framework should, 
among other things: allow subnational governments to borrow and issue bonds only for capital investment 
purposes; specify the sources of borrowing (e.g., domestic financial institutions, special investment 
banks, and the like); require that the maturity of the loan match the project life; specify that subnational 
debt remains the responsibility of the subnational government (and not the central government); allow 
subnational governments to offer as guarantee for repayment the revenues generated from the project (a 
common practice in many developed countries); impose some limit on total indebtedness; require central 
government prior approval; and specify penalties for failure to meet debt obligations.  It is especially 
important that the central government oversight should not extend to central government guarantor of 
municipal bond issues.  Details of various regulatory schemes are discussed later. 
 
However, municipal government borrowing has also often created problems of various types.
5  First, the 
granting of preferential borrowing terms to local governments may create “moral hazard” problems in 
which local governments borrow more than is economically justified. Second and relatedly, local 
governments – and lenders – may believe that the central government will assume responsibility for any 
loans that the local governments are unable to repay, again creating a moral hazard problem that 
encourages lenders to make excessive loans to local governments and that also encourages local 
governments to borrow excessively.  These actions impose largely unplanned and uncontrollable financial 
burdens on the central government that complicate overall macroeconomic stabilization policies.  Indeed, 
there is much evidence that decentralization of local government borrowing has contributed to 
stabilization problems in countries like Brazil, China, and Colombia.  See Box 5 for a discussion of the 
recent Argentina experience.  
                                                 
5  See Tanzi (1996) and Ahmad, Albino-War, and Singh (2005) for further discussion of the macroeconomic concerns stemming 
from decentralization. 
Box 4: International Experience with Municipal Development Funds 
  
In many western European countries, and now in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 
there are specific institutions that have been established to allow subnational government borrowing 
for investment purposes.  These institutions are sometimes called a municipal development fund 
(MDF); the management of a MDF is typically assigned to banks or government regulatory 
agencies, which are referred to as a municipal development intermediary (MDI).  A municipal 
development fund is a pool of money operated at a level above individual subnational governments 
that is available to the subnational government for investment purposes.  The main objective of 
these pools of funds to mobilize resources from private lenders, the central government, and donor 
agencies, and to make these resources available for investment in urban infrastructure.  Another 
objective is to provide assistance to subnational governments in the design, appraisal, and 
execution of investment programs.  There are different approaches around the world in the 
management of these funds.  There are also different sources of initial funding, including initial 
subscriptions from the central government, private lenders (including other financial institutions, 
insurance companies, and pension funds), and international donors.  MDFs typically lend to local 
governments at preferential rates for long-term investments; in some cases, there are elements of 
grants to local governments (e.g., conditional matching grants or conditional block grants).  Eligibility 
is often unrestricted, although limits on loan amounts are common, especially for larger subnational 
governments.  Loans require subnational governments to meet various criteria, especially on debt 
service ratios.  Indeed, assessing debt service capacity remains a difficult consideration in the 
management of MDFs. 
 





These types of difficulties have led analysts to suggest ways in which municipal government borrowing 
can be more efficiently organized and regulated.  International experience with municipal government 
borrowing provides some specific suggestions on controls.  See Ter-Minassian (1996) and Ter-Minassian 
and Craig (1997) for detailed discussions.  The most important elements of any regulatory framework 
include: transparency via information and accounting systems, penalties for excessive borrowing, local 




Intergovernmental Transfers for Infrastructure Finance: Capital Grants. 
 
Another potential source of initial investment finance (as well as ongoing operation and maintenance 
finance) is intergovernmental transfers.  Transfers are typically justified on several grounds: 
  To correct for vertical imbalances (e.g., between the national and the subnational governments) 
  To correct for horizontal imbalances (e.g., between the subnational governments) 
  To accommodate political differences and considerations 
  To correct for externalities 
  To achieve national objectives pursued at subnational levels. 
All of these rationales can, in principle, be used to justify transfers that finance municipal infrastructure.  
Specifically, capital transfers can be used to assist in financing “lumpy” capital investments (e.g., vertical 
and horizontal imbalances), to offset significantly different infrastructure endowments (at least when these 
are not the result of voluntary local decisions (e.g., imbalances again), to address externalities across 
subnational governments, and to pursue national sectoral objectives at subnational levels. 
 
Box 5: Subnational Borrowing in Argentina 
  
Argentina is divided into 24 autonomous political jurisdictions consisting of 23 provinces and the City 
of Buenos Aires. With approximately 50 percent of total public spending occurring at the sub-
national level, it is the most decentralized country in Latin America. At the same time, the most 
important taxes are collected at the national level, which implies a significant degree of vertical 
imbalance.  However, within Argentina’s federal structure all levels of government are generally 
permitted to borrow both domestically and abroad, and during the 1980s and 1990s both levels of 
government borrowed extensively, reflecting the weak fiscal management of the period.  Given 
especially the lack of formal limitations on domestic currency borrowing operations, provincial 
governments have frequently pledged future coparticipation receipts as collateral for borrowing from 
commercial banks; in addition, they sometimes developed alternative sources of financing.  These 
practices led eventually to the jurisdictions running unsustainable fiscal policies that often brought 
the provinces to the brink of bankruptcy.  The exact time when the province entered into a serious 
fiscal crisis was in some episodes prompted by the occurrence of exogenous shocks in the 
economy, as was the case with the Tequila crisis in 1995.  In this instance, the intervention of the 
federal government nationalizing the provincial pension systems and also in the case of Cordoba 
was mainly accelerated by the effect of the Tequila shock on those provinces’ finances of those 
provinces. On other occasions, the provinces’ fiscal distress was associated with an acute political 
crisis, which in turn motivated financial and political intervention by the federal government.  In 
general, however, the federal government did not set up extensive and generous rescue operations. 
They were more a case-by-case-type solution.  Using these mechanisms and negotiations, the 
federal government tried to obtain some benefits (such as provincial adjustment, reforms) in 
exchange for the financial help it extended.  Even though the central authorities showed generosity 
toward some small and poor jurisdictions, federal support for other provinces, most notably large 
provinces such as Cordoba, was much less, and in the latter instances the province itself bore most 
of the cost of adjustment. 
 
Source: Nicolini, Posadas, Sanguinetti, Sanguinetti, and Tommas (2002).  
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Capital transfers are typically designed as project-based grants, which are closely administered and 
monitored by central government line ministries.  These transfers are also typically allocated in the form of 
categorical or block grants, often on the basis of ad hoc decisions and negotiations between the central 
and the subnational governments.  Sometimes there is a pre-established formula used to determine the 
amount of the transfer, such as the number of “clients” for a governmental service (e.g., students in 
construction of schools, patients in the construction of hospitals, cars in the construction of roads).  There 
is also sometimes some type of competition process with defined application procedures, although this 
process may be subject to manipulation. 
 
An important concern in capital transfers is how to achieve “additionality”, or maintenance of effort on the 
part of recipient governments.  Transfers are almost always given as conditional grants, but funds are 
obviously fungible.  Another concern is whether local governments will actually take “ownership” of the 
facility once it is constructed and maintain the infrastructure, given that the bulk of the funds used in 
construction usually come from the central government.  See again Box 2. 
 
Capital transfers – indeed, any intergovernmental transfer – carry with them significant institutional 
burdens and requirements.  An overriding issue is the constraint on design and evaluation imposed by 
data availability.  The allocation of most transfers is based on detailed formulae, all of which require 
detailed information that is often not available.  Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) discuss how transfers 
can be designed in a world with imperfect data.  Even so, it is important to improve data collection.  
Relatedly, intergovernmental transfers require a strong central government ability to monitor the actual 
use of grants, as well as to monitor the performance of the grants; this also requires data upon which 
these evaluations are based.   Many countries have chosen to use a special, independent “grants 
commission” to administer its transfer, in order to remove as much as possible the role of politics in grant 
design and allocation. 
 
Overall, international experience suggests that there is no single best approach to design capital 
transfers.   However, non-transparent, highly detailed and discretionary procedures should be avoided, 
and matching requirements in capital transfers can generate many benefits. 
 





Public-private partnerships, also sometimes referred to as private participation in infrastructure (PPI), 
have been seen as a way to provide infrastructure without imposing an excessive fiscal burden on 




Box 6: Public-Private Partnerships 
 
The intense fiscal pressures in many developing countries have made the prospect of shifting 
investment responsibility to private infrastructure providers an attractive alternative to public sector 
provision, by offering the possibility of expanded and improved services without further burdening 
the government sector with additional fiscal demands.  However, the general experience of these 
public-private partnerships has been disappointing, and they have played a far less significant role 
in financing infrastructure in cities than was hoped for.  In particular, these partnerships have 
mobilized little private finance, for various practical, political, economic and institutional reasons.  
Indeed, these partnerships seem unlikely to eliminate, or even to reduce, the various constraints 
that these factors impose, in part because there are a number of features that raise the risk profile 
for of urban infrastructure for private investors, factors that are outside the control of many cities, 
factors that are unlikely to change. 
 






Indeed, one method of achieving greater private sector involvement is to privatize completely the service 
to the private sector.  This option is often viewed as a means for lowering costs by encouraging 
competition.  It is also viewed as a way to minimize the financial burden that service provision would 
impose on municipal governments, and as a way of improving service quality.  However, the record of 




Land- and Asset-based Sources of Finance.  
 
Box 7: Privatization of Infrastructure: Some Lessons from Experience 
  
Privatization is often viewed as a means for lowering costs by encouraging competition. The 
presumption is that public sector producers have poor incentives for efficient operation because they 
lack pressure to operate at the lowest cost. The private sector, on the other hand, is presumed to be 
subject to competitive forces.  However, the public sector does not always have poor incentives and 
the private sector does not always face competitive pressures, so benefits do not always result from 
privatization.  
 
Urban transit is an area in which private production can lower cost.  Public bus systems 
often require large subsidies because of high operating costs.  In the 1990s, the system in Karachi 
received a $5 million annual subsidy, the system in Calcutta a $10 million subsidy, and the system 
in Bangkok a $30 million subsidy.  On the other hand, the private sector Seoul system, which had 90 
operating bus companies, received no subsidy.  Private minibus systems have proven very effective 
in many cities.  Some public bus systems, such as the one in Bombay, also operate without a 
subsidy.  Some urban water supply activities in Chile, solid waste disposal and collection in Brazil, 
and intracity transportation in Nairobi are examples of effective private production of services. 
 
Even if privatization appears beneficial, the public sector will typically be required to maintain a role 
in providing most infrastructure.  One reason is that the private sector does not adequately provide 
for externalities, such as sewerage, dams, and roads, unless government financing is involved 
because of inability to charge user fees sufficient to finance the services.  Also, some infrastructure 
services may be characterized by large economies of scale in production or distribution.  The 
government may need to be involved in establishing a pricing scheme or subsidizing the service to 
move toward universal service.  The government may also need to participate, at least in financing, 
if provision 
of infrastructure services is to be used as a way of redistributing income.  Finally, the government 
may be required to regulate privatized firms, through regulation of service quality and of prices. 
 
A key to obtaining the benefits of privatization is to encourage competitive market pressures. Neither 
government production nor close regulation may be necessary if the market is contestable.  In many 
cases the private market may not exist in developing countries, and needs to be encouraged to 
evolve. Also, competition can be generated by 
allowing foreign firms to compete.  Belize and Guatemala permitted foreign firms to compete for 
road maintenance because no significant domestic market existed.  Government should seek to 
gain the benefits of competitive market for service delivery by identifying aspects of infrastructure 
delivery that are contestable and allowing the private sector to compete for these portions of service 
delivery, by allowing all private firms equal access to shared infrastructure facilities (e.g., telephone 
and railroad lines), and by permitting private sector alternatives that compete with infrastructure 
services. 
 
Sources: Fox (1994) and Guthrie (2006).  
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Municipal governments often have access to various “assets”, especially urban land, which the 
governments believe can be used to help finance infrastructure.  As classified by Peterson (2008), land-
based financing may be classified in three main categories: developer exactions (including impact fees), 
value capture, and land asset management.  Such methods have been used with some success in Cairo, 
Mumbai, Bangalore, Istanbul, Cape Town, and Bogota. 
 
With developer exactions, developers are required to finance some or all of the infrastructure that new 
developments impose on local governments, such as roads, water and power delivery, and sewage 
treatment.  In the United States, such developer exactions are often called impact fees, and are a 
commonly used method of infrastructure finance, especially in Florida, Colorado, and California.  This 
method is consistent with the notion that existing residents of a municipality should not be required to pay 
for the costs of infrastructure required by new residents; that is, “development should pay its own way”, 
and the new residents are (in the absence of such charges) not paying the full social costs of their 
activities.  The obvious remedy is to impose an additional charge on new residential and 
commercial/industrial construction that reflects these added social costs.  If, when faced with the true 
social costs of their actions, individuals and businesses believe that their own benefits are greater than 
the costs of their actions, then such growth is economically desirable and should not be further limited or 
controlled; if individuals and businesses believe that the costs are greater than the benefits, then it is 
appropriate that such growth be discouraged.  It is mainly this argument that underlies the increasingly 
popular use of impact (or development) fees in localities across the United States.  Of course, an 
additional argument for impact fees is that they may generate the revenues necessary to provide the 
infrastructure.  The main difficulty in the practical application of developer exactions is the actual 
calculation of the fee.  In principle, the fee should measure the incremental costs of new construction, 
including infrastructure costs and also congestion costs.  The calculation of the latter costs is particularly 
difficult.  Although developers often oppose impact fees, experience indicates that developers in fact 
typically prefer impact fees to other methods of growth controls (e.g., zoning, regulations, outright growth 
limitations), primarily because they are far less complicated and much more certain. 
 
Another method is land value capture.  The provision of infrastructure is typically capitalized in land and 
housing values, and the notion here is that the local government should be able to appropriate some of 
this increase in value.  Various methods have been used to capture the increases in value, especially 
betterment levies (which tax some percentage of the increase value via a one-time charge) and sale of 
land whose value has increased from the infrastructure.  Betterment levies were used with some success 
in Colombia in the past, but difficulties in accurately assessing increases in values have proven difficult.  
China has more recently used land sales. 
 
A final method is land asset management, where municipal governments exchange land assets for 
infrastructure assets.  Cairo has used several variants of this approach to generate close to $5 billion in 
revenues.  
 
Peterson (2008) argues that all three methods should be part of an infrastructure strategy of municipal 
governments: municipalities should first conduct a thorough inventory of land and other assets, they 
should then use developer exactions for partial finance of infrastructure, and they should finally use value 
capture to generate additional revenues to fill in specific gaps. 
 
 
5.2. Ongoing Operation and Maintenance Expenses 
 
User Fees as the “Ideal” Source. 
 
User fees are widely seen as the most appropriate source of revenues for operation and maintenance 
expenses.  If set at marginal cost of service provision, user fees can generate the revenues necessary to 
pay for ongoing variable costs of service provision.  In addition, if set at appropriate levels, user fees can 
serve the same basic function as market prices for market commodities, as an indicator of consumer 
willingness to pay for services.  More generally, it is typically recommended that local governments should  
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rely predominately upon user charges to finance goods that provide measurable benefits to identifiable 
individuals within a single jurisdiction. 
 
However, the actual extent of cost recovery via user fees is almost everywhere quite poor.  Various 






Municipal Tax Revenues.   
 
Municipal governments can also finance infrastructure-related expenses from tax revenues.  Although 
there is much diversity in the fiscal structures of national and subnational governments, several general 
“best practices” have emerged that provide a useful point of departure (Musgrave, 1983; McLure, 1994, 
2006; Bird, 1999; Bahl and Bird, 2008): 
  The Subsidiarity Principle should be applied to taxes as well as to expenditures: taxes should be 
assigned to the lowest level of government that can administer the tax efficiently, and for similar 
reasons. 
  Local governments should rely predominately taxes, and taxes on immobile tax bases, to finance 
local services for which it is difficult to identify individual beneficiaries and to measure individual 
costs and benefits. 
  Local governments should rely predominately upon user charges to finance goods that provide 
measurable benefits to identifiable individuals within the jurisdiction. 
  Local governments should avoid taxes on mobile tax bases, especially capital, and should also 
avoid imposing progressive income taxes.  Local government attempts to redistribute income by 
progressive income taxes will lead to the out-migration of more mobile, higher income individuals, 
thereby leaving more immobile, lower income individuals to bear the burden of the taxes.  As with 
progressive income taxes, the potential mobility of capital or other mobile factors of production 
will lead to out-migration if these factors are taxed at higher-than-average tax rates.  By the same 
token, attempts to induce in-migration of mobile factors can lead to the so-called “race to the 
bottom”, as local governments compete with each to attract and to hold these factors by 
extending tax breaks and other fiscal incentives. 
  Local governments should be assigned adequate sources of revenues consistent with their 
expenditure responsibilities.  Local governments should have discretion over the rate of some 
taxes to promote accountability of local officials and to establish a link between services 
demanded and the cost of service provision.  Locally assigned taxes should exhibit adequate 
revenue elasticity so that collections can grow with the demand of services over time. The 
assignment of taxes should also meet the test of administrative feasibility. 
  Intergovernmental transfers should be used to finance those services that generate spillovers to 
nearby jurisdictions, since strictly local finance will lead to inefficient provision.  The central 
government should impose taxes on those tax bases that are distributed unequally across 
Box 8: Cost Recovery from User Fees: The African Experience 
 
Although data are often poor or even non-existent, the limited evidence that is available indicates 
that African countries typically do not charge for public services – for water supply, sewerage, 
electricity, telecommunications, markets, housing, public transport, and land development – to the 
extent that is consistent with enhancing economic efficiency and providing adequate revenues for 
service delivery.  Prices are often charged for services, in areas and sectors as diverse as: public 
toilets in Accra, Ghana; water delivery in Lagos, Nigeria, Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya; public 
utilities in Francistown, Botswana; and sanitation in Kitwe and Lusaka, Zambia.  However, with 
some exceptions, these prices are invariably subsidized at levels well below marginal cost.  
Problems include inadequate billing and collection procedures, insufficient attention to operations 
and maintenance, and political constraints.    
 
Source: Fox and Edmiston (2000).  
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jurisdictions, and use the revenues from these taxes to equalize fiscal capacities across these 
areas. 
 
(Recall that borrowing should be used to finance long-lived capital investments on infrastructure.)  In 
short, a “good” municipal tax system should not unduly distort individual and firm decisions, should 
generate sufficient revenues to allow the government to finance at the margin their expenditures, and 
should burden only local residents.
6 
 
The broad pattern of municipal finance in cities around the world is consistent with some, but seldom all, 
of these principles.  Indeed, there is much diversity in the fiscal structures of municipal governments.  
Despite enormous efforts made over the years on tax assignment issues, Bahl and Bird (2008) argue that 
there is still no general consensus about what works and what does not. 
 
Around the world there are essentially two basic models of revenue assignment that attempt to satisfy 
these principles.  In what might be called the Western or Anglo-Saxon model of “fiscally strong local 
governments” (e.g., the United States, Canada, Australia), local governments independently legislate and 
administer their own taxes, an approach that obviously gives local governments significant fiscal 
autonomy and adequacy.  However, this model is probably not appropriate for many countries.  Instead, 
in many other countries the model is one of “fiscally weak local governments” that do not generate much 
revenue from their own sources, that do not independently legislate and administer their own taxes, but 
that are often allowed to add a local tax onto the back of some existing central government tax.  This 
approach is often and increasingly used as part of decentralization reforms around the world (Bahl and 
Linn, 1992). 
 
It is useful to discuss in more detail the major types of taxes that are used by many local governments, 
since this discussion relates directly to the often limited ability of municipal governments to generate 
funds for infrastructure. 
 
Although there is much diversity in country experiences, the property tax is a common and important tax 
for municipal governments, especially those in the Western or Anglo-Saxon tradition.  The property tax is 
in many ways an attractive revenue source.  If measured properly, its base should increase with urban 
growth.  Because property can be assessed by physical inspection, the tax is difficult to evade.  There is 
much evidence that the tax has at least a proportional and often a progressive effect upon the distribution 
of income.  The tax is unlikely to create serious distortions in land markets, and may in some 
circumstances actually improve the efficiency of resource use.  Finally, it is sometimes argued that the 
property tax is most appropriately administered at the local government level because officials there have 
a better motivation to collect the tax and because the tax can be viewed in part as payment for local 
services (especially if property values are tied to the levels of some of those services). 
 
However, there are also major difficulties with the property tax.  The revenue potential of the property tax 
is seldom realized, due largely to significant administrative problems in identifying properties, valuing 
them, adjusting valuation over time, collecting revenues, and enforcing penalties.  Also, the tax base is 
typically distributed across local governments in very uneven ways, thereby contributing to extreme 
horizontal fiscal disparities across jurisdictions.  Perhaps as a result, despite compelling evidence to the 
contrary, the property tax is actually seen by individuals as a regressive tax, one in which greater burdens 
are imposed on lower- than on higher-income households.  All of these issues are well-known, but this 
recognition has done little to improve the administration of the tax, even in wealthy countries.  Indeed, the 
property tax is often rated by individuals in polls as among the least popular of all taxes. 
 
Many local governments impose taxes on automobile ownership and use, such as an annual license tax, 
a registration fee, a transfer tax, a parking fee, tolls, and, at times, a fuel tax (although most countries 
reserve fuel taxes for central government use).  Because car ownership is concentrated in upper income 
                                                 
6  A “good” local tax should therefore have several main characteristics: the tax base should be immobile; the tax should generate 
adequate, predictable, and growing revenues; the tax should be visible to and borne by local residents; the tax should be perceived 
to be “fair”; and the tax should be easy to administer by the local government.  
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classes, automotive taxes are likely to increase the progressivity of local government finances. Revenues 
are likely to grow steadily with urban growth.  The taxes can be administered at relatively low cost.  They 
can be used for general financing, but they can also be earmarked to finance road construction and 
maintenance and to decrease congestion and pollution in urban areas.  However, with a few exceptions, 
these taxes are a significantly underused source of revenue. 
 
There are several indirect taxes that are potential revenue sources for local governments.  Local 
governments often impose a range of specific excise taxes, sometimes called sumptuary taxes, on 
commodities like beer, liquor, and tobacco.  These taxes generate substantial revenues, they are easy to 
collect, and they may well discourage consumption of harmful or “immoral” commodities (or “sin taxes”).  
However, such taxes are also unlikely to grow much over time, they may be regressive, and their use is 
clouded by the possibility of individuals buying commodities (or smuggling them) from outside the 
boundaries of the taxing jurisdiction.  Furthermore, collection of excise taxes tends to be concentrated at 
borders or factory locations, so that they are often unevenly distributed across local governments.  It is 
possible that local governments could obtain some revenues from, say, a central government sales tax, 
by adding a surtax onto the central government rate, by sharing a specified percentage of the national 
government collections, or by having a separate retail sales taxes. 
 
Finally, it is not uncommon for local governments to impose a surtax, or an additional local government 
tax, on a national government income tax, along the same lines as a local surtax on a national 
government sales tax.  The use of such a “piggyback income tax” is a common practice in Scandinavian 
and central European countries.  There are a number of reasons for caution in the use of a local 
government piggyback income tax, most of which are the same disadvantages as for direct local income 
taxes.  For example, a local government income surtax could generate distortions in resource use, as 
individuals move to avoid paying the tax and as cities “compete” with one another by changing the tax 
rate.  Still, there are some clear advantages to local surtaxes.  The central government administers the 
tax, thereby avoiding unnecessary duplication of administrative efforts.  The central government also 
retains the authority to define the tax base, which reduces locational distortions from mobile factors and 
which also reduces interferences of local governments in national stabilization policies, even if these 
coordination problems are not eliminated.  Importantly, local governments are given some discretion in 
choosing tax rates, within some lower and upper bounds, and this choice enhances their ability to make 
effective fiscal decisions.  Indeed, surcharges of various types have been increasingly recommended as 
part of decentralization efforts around the world, especially in transition countries where it is necessary to 
find some fast and sustainable way to give cities a significant fiscal capacity. 
 
Of course, tax systems are designed to achieve multiple objectives.  An obvious purpose is to raise the 
revenues necessary to finance government expenditures (sometimes termed “adequacy”), and also to 
ensure that the growth in revenues is adequate to meet expenditure requirements (“elasticity”).  Another 
is to distribute the burden of taxation in a way that meets with a society’s notions of fairness and equity.  
Equity is typically defined in terms of “ability to pay,” such that those with equal ability should pay equal 
taxes (“horizontal equity”) and those with greater ability should pay greater taxes (“vertical equity”).  Taxes 
can also be used to influence behavior of those who pay them; in choosing taxes, a common goal is to 
minimize the interference of taxes in the economic decisions of individuals and firms.  Taxes should be 
simple, both to administer and to comply with, because a complicated tax system wastes the resources of 
tax administrators and taxpayers.  The appropriate design of taxes requires balancing tradeoffs among 
these various goals.  Also, some of these various goals of taxation can also be achieved by tax sharing 
among governments, although tax sharing does not typically give local governments any real authority in 
the selection of local tax rates and therefore does not promote accountability and efficiency in local 
expenditures. 
 
Even so, tax assignment does not always follow these principles.  Common problems include: 
  Vertical imbalance (e.g., an inadequate correspondence between expenditure responsibilities of 
municipal governments and their assigned sources of revenues) 
  Lack of meaningful tax autonomy, as reflected in excessive reliance on shared taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers 
  Unstable and/or confused tax assignments  
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  Assignments with inefficient incentives 
  Horizontal imbalance (e.g., an inequitable or uneven apportionment of tax revenues among 
subnational jurisdictions). 
 
It is also the case that subnational revenue mobilization remains extremely variable around the world, and 
is often quite low.  See Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Measures of Fiscal Decentralization 
  1970s  1980s  1990s-2000s 














Subnational  Taxes 



































Numbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 
Source: Government Finance Statistics, various issues. 
 
 
Intergovernmental Transfers Once Again. 
 
There are various ways by which transfers can be classified.  One method focuses on the specific type of 
grant: unconditional versus conditional transfers (e.g., a transfer that can be spent on any service versus 
a transfer that must be spent on a specific and designated category); non-matching versus matching 
transfers, where “matching” refers to a specific percentage of recipient expenditures that is subsidized by 
the donor government; and close-ended versus open-ended transfers (e.g. a grant whose amount is 
limited versus a grant that is not limited).  Another method focuses more on the details of grant system 
design, and considers several dimensions of this design, typically the methods by which total divisible 
pool of funds is determined and also the methods by which the pool is allocated among eligible units. 
 
As noted earlier, international experience suggests that there is no single best approach to design capital 
transfers.  However, transfers that are simple, transparent, and stable seem better able to achieve 
transfer objectives than transfers that are non-transparent, highly detailed, and discretionary.  It is also 
important to recognize that one grant/transfer instrument cannot accomplish multiple objectives.  See Box 
9 for an example of the problems generated when a single transfer attempts to achieve too many 




Box 9: Intergovernmental Transfers in South Africa – the Provincial Equitable Share 
 
The Provincial Equitable Share (PES) transfer is a formula-driven grant program that distributes 
unconditional transfers to provinces in South Africa.  The formula consists of six components that 
capture the relative demand for services between provinces and that take into account specific 
provincial circumstances:   
  An education share (51 per cent) based on the size of the school-age population (ages 5-
17) and the number of learners (Grade R to 12) enrolled in public schools 
  A health share (26 per cent) based on the proportion of the population with and without 
access to medical aid 
  A basic share (14 per cent) derived from each province’s share of the national population 
  An institutional component (5 per cent) divided equally between the provinces 
  A poverty component (3 per cent) that reinforces the redistributive element 
  An economic output component (1 per cent) based on GDP by region. 
A standard principle of policy design is to use one separate instrument for each different objective, 
and a common problem in many countries with the design of transfers like equalization grants is that 
they get overloaded with many policy objectives; at the end it is not clear what is pursued or 
achieved with the transfer system.  The PES illustrates this problem: it attempts to achieve too many 
objectives, and it does not achieve any one clearly.   An important question therefore is: What is the 
primary goal of the PES in South Africa?  The PES can be defined as a constitutional entitlement on 
central government revenues for each sphere of government.  In this view the PES formula should 
be concerned with how the shares can be allocated equitably.  However, an equitable distribution 
formula is not necessarily equivalent to an equalization formula in the traditional sense of 
addressing fiscal gaps or horizontal disparities between sub-national government units.  For 
example, the notion of equity may require the distribution of funds for reasons other than achieving 
greater equality, such as providing more funds to those provincial governments that are more 
entitled for some reason (e.g., the presence of natural resources in their territories).  It is clear that 
currently there are too many objectives other than equity/equalization being pursued with the PES 
transfer.  For example, the “economic activity” component of the formula is nothing more than some 
form of revenue sharing on a derivation basis. Revenue sharing is a form of transfer used in many 
countries as a solution to closing vertical imbalances (since central governments collect much more 
than the expenditure responsibilities demand), and it may also be a way to let richer sub-national 
governments get their share in the wealth/revenues collected in their territories.  As such, South 
Africa can also make use of revenue sharing, but this “economic activity” component does not really 
belong in a traditional equalization transfer.  Indeed, in most countries revenue sharing is arranged 
separately from other transfers, including equalization transfers.  Thus, the most fundamental 
question that needs to be answered is what exactly is the purpose of the PES.   Is it to equalize, 
distribute, or redistribute public funds to the provinces?   Is it instead a general funding mechanism 
to enable the provinces to deliver constitutionally mandated services?  Or is it other things?  These 
questions remain unanswered. 
 
Source: Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2009).  
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6.  The Role of Institutions 
 
As noted earlier, the conditions under which decentralization “works” include a range of factors, many of 
which relate to the institutional structures of the relevant country, including the governance structures of 
urban areas and the administrative capacities of municipal governments.  This section examines the 
potential impacts of governance institutions. 
 
   
6.1. What Do Urban Governments Do? 
 
The Subsidiarity Principle suggests a list of fairly specific functions for urban governments.  These include 
responsibilities for: 
  Roads and bridges 
  Public transit 
  Street lighting 
  Sidewalks 
  Water system 
  Sewer system 
  Garbage collection and disposal 
  Police protection 
  Fire suppression and prevention 
  Land use planning 
  Economic development 
  Parks and recreation 
  Libraries 
Some other functions often performed (at least in part) by municipal governments include welfare 
assistance, child care services, housing, and public health, although these types of functions have strong 
elements of income distribution, a function usually assigned to the central government. 
 
 
6.2. Some Types of Municipal Governance Structures Around the World  
 
As argued by Bird and Slack (2007), local governance is critical in the physical and social character of 
city-regions. The quality and nature of these institutions affect both the quantity and the quality of local 
public services and the efficiency with which they are delivered.   
 
Recall that the Subsidiarity Principle argues that the efficient provision of services requires decision 
making to be carried out by the lowest level of government that can do so efficiently because a 
government “closer to the people” will be better able to adjust services to the demands of its citizens.  
There is also the implication that smaller governments will stimulate competition between local 
jurisdictions, which will in turn induce them to offer the best possible mix of taxes and services to 
individuals who will “vote with their feet” by moving between jurisdictions (Tiebout, ,1056).  Factors that 
argue for a larger consolidated government structure are economies of scale in service provision and the 
existence of interjurisdictional externalities, both of which suggest that a larger government jurisdiction 
may be needed to consider appropriately the full extent of benefits and costs of public services.  A larger 
government jurisdiction may also be necessary to collect more efficiently tax revenues.  The relevant 
choice of an appropriate governance structure is therefore unclear, and depends largely upon how one 
weighs these conflicting considerations.  Indeed, it is striking that no “one size fits all” strategy emerges 
when these tradeoffs are fully considered.  As is often the case with institutional design, the broad 
questions that are relevant seem universal, but the answers are invariably dependent on specific context. 
 
Bird and Slack (2007) identify several main types of municipal governance; see also Slack (2007) and 
Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009).  These include what they term a one-tier model of municipal  
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governance, a two-tier model, a voluntary cooperation model, and special-purpose districts.  Consider 
each type. 
 
Under the one-tier model a single local government is responsible for providing the full range of local 
services. The one-tier model can take two distinct forms: a series of small fragmented municipalities in a 
metropolitan area, or one large consolidated municipality for the whole area.  Fragmented one-tier 
governments are common in the United States.  The two-tier model consists of an upper tier governing 
body (usually a region, district, or metropolitan area) that encompasses a large geographic area and that 
is responsible for services that have wide-scale benefits, that generate externalities, or that demonstrate 
economies of scale; lower tier units cover smaller areas and are responsible for services that provide 
local benefits.  The voluntary cooperation model is closer to a de minimis government structure, in which 
there is an area-wide body based on voluntary cooperation between existing units of local government 
with no permanent, independent institutional status.  These structures are politically easy to create – and 
to disband – but their effectiveness is limited due to the purely voluntary nature of the arrangements.  A 
last form of organization is special-purpose districts, which are typically used to deliver services that 
extend beyond municipal boundaries. 
 
In sum, neither theory nor practice tells us clearly which model of governance is “best” for large 
metropolitan areas.  Nonetheless, one main conclusion is that a strong regional structure encompassing 
the entire city-region is important.  Metropolitan areas have strong interdependencies (institutional and 
economic), and some form of regional governance is needed to address such problems of a regional 
nature.  Few problems stop at municipal boundaries, and most solutions require coordinating the 
decisions of larger geographical units than characterize a “typical” local government. 
 
However, what kind of regional structure is called for here?  Bird and Slack (2007) conclude that different 
models have worked successfully in different places.  Indeed, it follows that a second main conclusion is 
that what is more important than the precise form of governance is simply that some form of governance 
– and some form of effective governance – be in place.  Bird and Slack (2007) also suggest that the real 
choice usually comes down to one-tier versus two-tier structures.  Because a one-tier structure is simpler 
to understand and more transparent than a two-tier structure, a one-tier structure may improve 
accountability; a one-tier structure may also encourage greater local government experimentation, and it 
may give individuals more choices in where they choose to live. Two-tier structures may be better able to 
achieve efficiencies (e.g., economies of scale, externalities), but their greater complexity may result in 
confusion among citizens about responsibilities and burdens and so in less accountability. 
 
 
7.  Some Evidence: Selected Information on Municipal Capital Investments 
 
Data on the extent of subnational borrowing is notoriously variable, non-standardized, and unreliable.  In 
many cases, the data that are available are collected by local experts, so that there is a strong 
idiosyncratic element that is present.  Even so, Table 2 gives some selected information on the relative 
reliance of local governments on borrowing as a source of own-source revenues, mainly for selected 
years in the 1990s, as compiled by Alm and Indrawati (2004).  The extent of local government borrowing 
seems quite variable but generally seems quite low. 
 
 
Table 2. Local Government Reliance upon Borrowing in Selected Countries 
  Share of Borrowing in Local Government Revenues 
(percent) 
Industrial Countries 
Austria  8 
Belgium  0 
Cyprus  12 
Denmark  0 
Finland  6  
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France  9 
Germany  9 
Greece  4 
Iceland  0 
Ireland  5 
Italy  7 
Luxembourg  9 
Netherlands  0 
Norway  0 
Portugal  7 
Spain  13 
Sweden  0 
Switzerland  4 
Turkey  0 
United Kingdom  8 
Developing Countries 
Ghana  0 
Malta  0 
San Marino  69 
Senegal  2 
Swaziland  4 
Uganda  0 
Zambia  0 
Zimbabwe  3 
Transition Economies 
Albania  0 
Bulgaria  3 
Czech Republic  10 
Estonia  3 
Hungary  7 
Latvia  0 
Lithuania  0 
Macedonia  0 
Poland  0 
Romania  0 
Russian Federation  0 
Slovakia  4 
Slovenia  0 
Source: Alm and Indrawati (2004). 
 
 
8.  Case Studies: Examples of Successful/Unsuccessful Municipal Finance 
 
In this section I examine several specific case studies of urban infrastructure finance, using examples 
from Indonesia, the United States, Korea, Bangladesh, Bolivia, and China, all found in the existing 
literature. The case studies examine different aspects of municipal borrowing, municipal taxing, 
intergovernmental transfers, user charges (congestion fees), land-assets, privatization, and governance.  
These case studies illustrate different results, but there are several common themes throughout, 
regardless of whether the specific examples can be classified as a “success” or as a “failure”.  The 
specific conclusions from these studies are the following: 
  Establishing the conditions under which subnational borrowing can take place is a difficult 
undertaking. 
  The ability of municipal governments to generate significant amounts of own-source tax 
revenues, especially from the property tax, is often quite limited.  
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  User charges (including congestion fees) can be a useful source of revenues and can also have 
positive impacts on resource allocation, but their record is mixed. 
  Block transfers do not always achieve their intended results. 
  Privatization must pay attention to its distributional effects. 
  Land-acquisition by local governments can be abused by the governments, which can generate 
enormous hostility among land owners who feel exploited by the process of acquisition.  
  Urban governance has significant impacts on the expenditures of the relevant governments. 
 The more general and suggestive themes include: 
  There are multiple dimensions by which a project can be evaluated, and success/failure is often 
different across these dimensions. 
  The data necessary to conduct a thorough ex post evaluation of a project are often poor, even 
non-existent. 
  Indeed, it is often the case that s thorough ex ante benefit-cost analysis of a project is not done 
adequately; data problems are often the overriding issue. 
  The reasons for success/failure are often unclear. 




8.1. Subnational Borrowing in Indonesia  
 
Following independence from the Dutch after World War II, Indonesia had been established as a multi-tier 
state, with provinces below the central government in Jakarta and local governments as the third tier.  
Even so, most authority was concentrated in the central government, justified largely as a way of 
maintaining national unity and cohesion in a nation with over 200 million people spread across 14,000 
islands.  However, in May 1999, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) passed two laws that transformed 
intergovernmental relations: Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government (UU PD) and Law No. 25/1999 
on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions (UU PKPD).  Part of these 
reforms related to borrowing by subnational governments. 
 
Before the passage of these laws, local government borrowing had been controlled very tightly by the 
central government under Law No. 4/1974.  Under this law, regional governments were permitted to 
borrow, but only with the approval of central government and only under some limited circumstances.  
The extent of borrowing was quite limited, or well less than 0.5 percent of GDP; of this, most borrowing 
had been undertaken by the regional water authorities (or PDAMs).  Despite the favorable terms, the 
repayment of loans had been poor, and the arrears rate was high (Lewis, 2003). 
 
With the passage of Law No. 25/1999, the GOI changed to a new approach toward borrowing.  In 
principle, the law gave local governments substantial freedom to borrow from domestic sources and also 
from foreign sources (via the central government).  More specifically, long-term borrowing (e.g., more 
than one year) is only allowed for investment spending to build infrastructure than can generate revenue 
for repayment.  Even some short-term borrowing is permitted but only for the management of local 
government cash flow. 
 
However, these new borrowing powers raised many concerns about how local governments would 
actually respond, given especially ongoing worries about the largely unchanged capacity of local 
governments to manage their budgets (including their borrowing).  Accordingly, the central government 
faced pressure to restrain local government borrowing. 
 
Consequently, in practice, the central government has over the last decade maintained very strict 
limitations on local government borrowing, of various types.  For example, a government regulation on 
local borrowing (No. 107/2000) requires that: maximum accumulated debts must be less than 75 percent 
of general revenues from the previous budget; the debt service coverage ratio must be at least 2.5; 
maximum short-term borrowing cannot exceed 1/6 of current spending; borrowing must be approved by 
either the central government via the Ministry of Finance or by the local parliament (depending on the  
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source of borrowing); and commercial/private foreign borrowings are not allowed.  Even after imposing 
these regulations, the central government still felt the necessity – supported strongly and explicitly by 
multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – twice to delay the 
implementation of the local government borrowing regulations. 
 
A relevant issue here is the actual borrowing capacity of local governments in Indonesia.  Alm and 
Indrawati (2004) used estimates from the University of Indonesia on revenue and expenditures of local 
governments to measure potential local government borrowing capacity for the year 2001.
7 
8  According 
to their estimates, as presented in Table 3, most local governments in Indonesia have wide room to 
initiate new borrowing.  More than 80 percent of provincial governments, almost 95 percent of district/ 




Table 3. Local Government Borrowing Capacity in Indonesia 
 
 







Number  Percent  Number  Percent  Number  Percent 
More than 100 billion  5  19.2  22  9.5  2  3.3 
10 – 100 billion  14  53.9  171  73.7  17  28.3 
Less than 10 billion  2  7.7  27  11.6  11  18.3 
Not allowed to borrow  5  19.2  12  5.1  30  50.0 
Total  26  100  232  100  60  100 
Source: Alm and Indrawati (2004). 
 
 
Despite the apparent capacity of many local governments to borrow, central government controls have 
remained quite severe, due to the presence of enormous public debt, recurrent macroeconomic shocks 
(e.g., the tsunami of 2004, earthquakes), and ongoing concerns about the capacity of local governments 
to manage their budgets. On balance, Alm and Indrawati (2004) concluded that the GOI policies seem 
designed mainly to deal with macroeconomic considerations of the central government, and not to create 
a system to allow local governments to gain access to credit markets.  These central government 
restrictions remain largely in place, even today. 
 
In order to reduce the negative impacts of these government controls, Alm and Indrawati (2004) argued 
that the central government must design a transition strategy to adjust from the current reliance on direct 
administrative control of local borrowing to a greater reliance on market discipline policy, including such 
actions as: improving and implementing a government accounting system for fiscal management; 
imposing requirements of local borrowing that replicate market discipline; diversifying the sources of any 
local borrowing fund; using less reliance upon the central government budget and foreign government 
borrowing and greater reliance on private market sources; and creating regulatory bodies to support, 
                                                 
7  Note that local government revenues mainly come three sources: fiscal transfers from the central government (e.g., general block 
grants, specific grants); revenue sharing from natural resources (oil, gas, forestry, mining, fishery), the property tax, and user fees; 
and local own-source revenues. 
8 Projections of the revenue side were based upon the following assumptions and procedures: 
  Local-own revenues were estimated using their annual performance in 1999/2000. 
  Revenue sharing from natural resources was based on Ministry of Finance calculations, which project distributions to local 
governments in 2001. 
  Revenue sharing of property taxes and acquisition fee was estimated using LPEM-FEUI simulations. 
  The general grant allocation was estimated using the LPEM-FEUI model, which will be used as a grant allocation formula 
in the government regulation.  
  Provincial governments were assumed to receive revenue sharing from the income tax (20 percent), which is not shared 
with district and city governments. 
Projections on the expenditure side used the following assumptions: 
  Routine expenditure was estimated using the figure for 1999/2000. 
  Investment spending was calculated using the DIK/List of investment activities that was submitted by local governments to 
the central government for the fiscal year 1999/2000.  
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facilitate, supervise, and safeguard the work of a local borrowing market.  They argued also that the long 
run goal must remain the creation of a viable market-oriented framework in which local governments face 




8.2. User Charges for Tunnels in Seoul 
 
Traffic congestion in Seoul increased dramatically in the 1980s despite new construction of urban 
freeways and subway lines.  In 1996 the Seoul metropolitan government began charging 2000 won (or 
slightly more than $2) for access through two tunnels (Namsan #1 and Namsan #3) that provided private 
vehicle links from downtown Seoul to the southern part of the city.  Charges were set for one- and two-
occupant private vehicles, and were collected in both directions on the basis of each entry with the times 
of 7am to 9pm during weekdays and from 7am to 3pm on Saturdays.  Private cars with three or more 
passengers, along with taxes, buses, vans, and trucks were exempt from the charges.  All traffic on 
Sundays and on national holidays was also exempt. 
 
As reported by Hwang, Son, and Eom (1999), in the two years following the enactment of the charges, 
there was a 34 percent reduction in peak-period passenger vehicle volumes.  Also, the average travel 
speed increased by 50 percent, and the number of toll-exempt vehicles increased substantially in both 
corridors.  Traffic on alternative routes increased by up to 15 percent, but the average speeds also 
increased due to improved traffic flows, especially at intersections with signals that were linked to the 
Namsan corridors.  Annual revenue from the two tunnels was $15 million, and was earmarked for 
transportation projects, including transport systems management and transport demand-management 
measures in the rest of Seoul. 
 
Singapore has also had some success with such congestion pricing, especially with its use of an 
electronic pricing system.  However, other countries have had more limited success, including Kuala 
Lumpur and Bangkok (Gwilliam, 2002) 
 
 
8.3. Property Tax Mobilization in Bangladesh Municipalities 
 
Since at least the 1980s, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) has consistently stated that it wishes to 
pursue fiscal decentralization.  True decentralization requires (among other things) that a local 
government have some control of its own (fiscal) fate, and this can be achieved only if the local 
government can itself change on the margin the revenues it collects and so the services it provides. 
 
Alm (1997) examined the revenue capabilities and performance of municipal governments 
(“pourashavas”) in Bangladesh.  He found that generally accepted principles of tax assignment for 
municipalities were largely followed in Bangladesh.  The principle own-revenue source for pourashavas 
was the holdings tax, a simplified form of a property tax, they also generated revenues from other 
property-related bases, such as leasing activities and a tax on the transfer of “immovable property.  
However, pourashava autonomy or discretion in the use of these revenue sources, especially in the 
establishment of rates, was extremely limited.  Also, the ability of many of these existing tax sources to 
generate adequate and significant amounts of additional revenues in the near-term was extremely limited; 
in particular, it was difficult to increase -- in a fast, significant, and sustainable way -- the yield of the 
holdings tax.   
 
Second, the available evidence, collected by a specially commissioned survey of pourashavas, indicated 
clearly that pourashavas generated extraordinarily small amounts of revenues from these sources.  The 
level of collections from these own-revenue sources was extremely and dismally low, varied enormously 
across pourashavas, and had grown erratically across pourashavas and over time.  Collections of total 
own revenues rarely exceeded Tk 100 per capita (relative to per capita gross domestic product at the 
                                                 
9  For a detailed discussion of how to create local credit systems, see especially Peterson (2000) and Noel (2000).  
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time of about Tk 9000), except in larger cities and in city corporations, and in some smaller pourashavas 
collections were even lower.  The variations in collections of total own revenues per capita across 
pourashavas were extremely great, and there were also extremely large differences by pourashavas in 
their growth rates of collections over time.  Many revenue sources were barely used at all.  In large part 
because of low collections from own sources, pourashavas were heavily dependent on central 
government transfers for much of their revenues. 
 
Third, various explanations were given for the poor pourashava revenue performance, including the 
political fears of raising taxes and the poverty of city residents.  More convincing reasons were the limited 
administrative capabilities of the pourashava personnel (especially for the holdings tax), the extreme 
undervaluation of the property tax base, the failure to impose penalties (especially on arrears), and the 
presence of corruption in pourashava administration.  Indeed, Alm (1997) concluded that many of the 
taxes assigned to pourashavas did not have any real revenue potential (a "vertical" imbalance"), and 
were more in the form of nuisance taxes. 
 
In short, Alm (1997) concluded that the ability of municipal governments to generate adequate revenues 
from the property tax – indeed from any tax currently assigned to pourashavas – was quite limited, even 
with improved tax administration.  He suggested that any increase in revenue capabilities required that 
pourashavas make greater use of the income potential from their own properties, including income from 
leasing and rentals.  More importantly, he argued that the limited ability of existing pourashava revenue 
sources required that pourashava use of new tax sources should be considered, especially a surcharge 
to the GOB individual income tax (e.g., a pourashava "piggyback" tax to the existing GOB income tax).  
He estimated that a 10 percent or a 25 percent local surcharge (on the income tax liability), for those 
pourashavas for which information on income tax collections was available from the National Board of 
Revenue, could give an immense increase in revenues.  For several pourashavas, a 25 percent 
surcharge would generate collections in excess of total own revenues from all current sources.  However, 
to date such piggyback taxes have not been enacted in Bangladesh.   
 
 
8.4. Grant Finance of Infrastructure: Lessons from the United States 
 
A significant amount of infrastructure finance in many municipalities comes from conditional block grants 
from the central government.  It is useful to examine the experiences of other countries with such grants, 
in particular that of the United States. 
 
In 1966, the Partnership for Health Act combined nine categorical health grants into one block grant for 
health.  Robbins (1976) and Stenberg and Walker (1977) analyzed the results of this consolidation, and 
concluded that the block grant increased the administrative flexibility of state health officials, even though 
state health planning agencies generally did not have a major influence on the block grant and state 
health planning agencies located in governors' offices had less influence over the block grant than those 
located in state health departments.  Most significantly, the new block grant did not generally result in a 
reordering of spending priorities, including any changes of infrastructure spending (e.g., hospital and 
other health facility construction).  Robbins (1976) and Stenberg and Walker (1977) argued that the best 
explanation for the unspectacular effect of combining several categorical grants into one block grant was 
that, without an increase in the amount of the overall amount of the transfer, the new administrative 
flexibility given state officials was insufficient to produce a substantive reordering of program priorities.  
 
More recently, Finegold, Wherry, and Schardin (2004) examined the entire United States history of block 
grants, beginning with the Partnership for Health Act in 1966 and extending to: the Safe Streets program, 
created under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; the Community Development 
Block Grant, the Social Services Block Grant, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
Block Grant of the 1970s; the consolidation of 77 categorical grants into 9 block grants as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981; and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, the welfare reform legislation that replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children and related programs with the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) block grant.  They  
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concluded that funding gradually declined over time for nearly all of the block grants.  They also found 
that Congress typically eroded over time the flexibility of the block grants by adding restrictions, requiring 
that a share of funds be set aside for particular purposes or creating new categorical programs with the 
same or related objectives.  These restrictions were justified by Congress as an attempt to deal with 
misuse or maladministration of the block grants by state and local governments, but were more likely 
enacted because of political benefits from more narrowly targeting the grants to specific constituents.  Not 
surprisingly, Finegold, Wherry, and Schardin (2004) concluded that block grants work best when state 
and local government administrative capacities are strong and already exist.  For example, following 
implementation of the Reagan block grants, state officials reported management improvements, including 
better planning and budgeting methods, changes in administrative procedures and standardization across 
programs, and increased efficiency in the use of state personnel (Peterson et al. 1986; GAO 1985).  Even 
so, the GAO (1982) found only a small reduction in overall administrative costs under the pre-1981 block 
grant programs, with administrative costs increasing in some cases, and few state administrators claimed 
savings of more than 5 percent under the Reagan block grants (Peterson and Nightingale 1995).  Indeed, 
implementation of new block grants has tended to be smoothest when states were already responsible for 
administering the categorical programs they replaced.  Finally, Finegold, Wherry, and Schardin (2004) 
reported mixed evidence from other studies that state governments used the increased flexibility of block 
grants to redirect spending away from individuals or communities with the greatest need.  The GAO 
(1982) study of pre-1981 block grants found the receipt of resources by target populations about the 
same under categorical and block grant programs, and Peterson et al. (1986) also found no indications 
that states had used their flexibility under the Reagan block grants to directly shift resources from poor or 
low-income families.  However, Bennett and Perez (1986) found that state allocations to local districts 
under the education block grant were based more on enrollment, and less on need, than under the 
categorical programs it replaced.  In this regard, there was little evidence from any study that the block 
grants achieved (where relevant and intended) any change in infrastructure spending, a result similar to 
that of Robbins (1976) and Stenberg and Walker (1977). 
 
 
8.5. Water Privatization – and Renationalization – in Bolivia 
 
The water sector in the Bolivian cities of La Paz and El Alto was privatized between 1997 and 2005.  
When the original concession contracts were formulated, the municipal governments and the private 
company agreed upon explicit coverage targets.  The agreement required that the company install 71,752 
new water connections by 2001, a coverage rate that provided essentially universal coverage in La Paz 
and 82 percent coverage in El Alto.  These coverage rates were largely achieved.  However, the private 
contracts were terminated in 2005, and the sector was renationalized. 
 
Hailu, Osorio, and Tsukada (2009) examined the performance of the private company during the 1997-
2005 period, and also explored the reasons for the renationalization.  Using data from national household 
surveys conducted by Bolivia’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, they found that access to water – 
measured by access to in-house piped water – expanded at higher rates in La Paz and El Alto than in 
cities with public provision.  They also found that access for poorer households increased substantially in 
the privatized cities; by 2005, the difference in coverage rates for the poorest 20 percent and the richest 
20 percent fell from 30 to 4 percentage points in El Alto and from 15 to 4 percentage points in La Paz. 
 
Even so, the private contracts were terminated.  One factor was the failure of the private company to 
meet all expansion-of-service contract stipulations.  More importantly, tariff increases allowed by the 
concession contracts and enacted by the private company provoked major public outrage.  Eventually, 
the unpopularity of private company attempts to achieve better cost recovery, together with the failure to 
meet legally binding targets led the governments to end the contracts. 
 
Hailu, Osorio, and Tsukda (2009) concluded that attempts to expand access to the poor cannot be met 
solely through privatization and require public efforts.   Estupinan et al. (2007) also come to similar 





8.6. Land-based Finance in China 
 
China is currently undergoing a rapid process of urbanization, arguably on the largest scale in human 
history.  Rapid urban expansion has resulted in much arable land being used for non-agricultural 
purposes.  Indeed, a major source of financing for this urban expansion is “land finance”, or the use of 
land requisition and public leasing, typically at “prices” that are significantly below true market value.  The 
Land Administration Law (LAL) was enacted in 1998, and allows the government to acquire land owned 
by collectives, if it is acting in the “public interest”.  However, there is no clear definition of the public 
interest, and this lack of clarity has often led the local governments to expand the legal scope of land 
acquisition.  In practice, governments have used the legal right to attain land from farmers or from 
farmers’ collectives for urban infrastructure development.  Of some note, land used for non-public usage 
such as for industrial, commercial, and residential projects also has to go through the public land 
requisition procedure, so that in practice nearly all the land used for urban development – whether by 
public or private enterprises – must be acquired by the local government, converted to state-owned land, 
and then used for public or private development purposes.  This means that under the current LAL neither 
farmers not collectives have much power to negotiate directly on the price at which their land will be 
acquired, and it also means that they cannot make a private transfer of land rights on their own.  The 
compensation terms for land acquisitions are, for the most part, decided unilaterally by the local 
government that acquires the land. 
 
Under the LAL, the compensation consists of three cash components: compensation for the land (at 6-10 
times the estimated land productivity), compensation for resettlement (at 4-6 times the estimated land 
productivity), and compensation for “accessory assets” in land.  Recently, some municipalities have 
promised farmers a monthly pension upon reaching retirement age, rather than providing cash 
compensation.  
 
However, municipal governments have typically abused their acquisition powers by offering 
compensation far below true market value.  Such low-cost land acquisition has allowed municipal 
governments to avoid heavy fiscal burdens of land acquisition, but has also generated significant 
distortions in land use and major burdens on dispossessed land owners.  Cao, Feng, and Tao (2008) 
report the results of a 17 province, 1962 farmer survey conducted in 2005, which documents the 15-fold 
increase in local government land acquisition in the previous 10 years and the corresponding increase in 
farmers’ grievances.  Dissatisfaction has apparently contributed to social unrest and political instability; in 
the first 9 months of 2006, China reported nearly 18,000 cases of “massive rural incidents” largely related 
to illegal acquisitions, in which 385,000 farmers protested against the government.   They also report that 
there are roughly 40 million dispossessed farmers due to urban expansion.  In response, the central 




8.7. Government Structure and Government Spending  in the United States 
 
Recall that the structure of urban governance is expected to affect the quantity and quality of government 
services.  One aspect of this effect is the impact on government spending.  Zax (1989) examines this 
issue by estimating the effects of the number of governments in a geographical area on the magnitude of 
government spending, using a sample of 3022 counties for the United States.  The sector should shrink if 
decentralization encourages competition among governments; it should increase if decentralization 
reduces the scope of scale economies.  He finds that larger county governments actually increase the 
size of government spending relative to county income.  He also finds that cities and towns increase 
competition and reduce government size, while more special districts sacrifice scale economies and 
increase government spending.  In short, decentralization that encourages competition reduces the size 
of the local public sector; decentralization that discourages scale economies increases government.  For 




9.  Some “Gaps” in Our Understanding 
 
This review of the literature on urban infrastructure suggests a number of areas in which our 
understanding is incomplete. 
 
First, what is the extent of municipal infrastructure spending?   Data are virtually non-existent.  Often the 
data that exist are compiled by local “experts”.  While these data can be useful, they are seldom uniform, 
representative, comprehensive, comparable across countries, or available for multiple years. 
 
Second, what is the extent of municipal government borrowing for infrastructure?  Again, significant data 
gaps exist. 
 
Third, how can the long-run borrowing capacity of municipal governments be built?  The example of 
Indonesia illustrates that the passage of legislation does not automatically lead to the establishment of the 
conditions under which local governments actually are able to borrow funds for infrastructure. 
 
Fourth, how can local credit markets be built in developing countries, including establishment of credit 
agencies? 
 
Fifth, what is the extent of municipal government assets?  There is rarely a systematic effort made to 
compile an “inventory” of local government assets?  Given the growth of land-based methods of 
infrastructure, it is essential for municipal governments to have a comprehensive and accurate inventory 
of the assets at their disposal.  Such inventories simply do not exist.  
 
Sixth, what is the extent of cost recovery from user costs?  Data here are typically more widely available, 
at least on the aggregate level of revenues that are generated.   
 
Seventh, what are the distributional effects of different financing schemes?  The case studies indicate the 
dominant role of distributional issues in public acceptance of many pricing schemes, but full distributional 
analyses are often unavailable.  As only one example, there is a large literature on the “incidence” of 
impact fees in the United States; there is little comparable work on developing countries, despite the 
growing use of land-based methods of finance. 
 
Eighth, what is the impact of intergovernmental transfers on infrastructure spending?  There is a large 
empirical literature on how governments respond in their spending decisions to the receipt of transfers, 
most focusing on the experience of developed countries, especially the United States.  Even so, many 
basic questions here remain unanswered, especially in the context of developing countries.  Does money 
“stick where it hits” (e.g., the so-called “flypaper effect”)?  Which types of grants are most stimulative?  
Are the impacts of capital transfers different than those of transfers that fund personnel and other current 
expenses? 
 
Ninth, what is the impact of governance on infrastructure spending, including the impact of different 
governance structures on cost efficiency of service delivery, on the level of government expenditures, and 
on the accountability of local governments?  There is no convincing evidence here. Indeed, the role of 
institutions is often overlooked, and even when institutions are considered, their roles are not fully 
understood.  Indeed, what are the metrics by which performance can be measured?  Is a “successful” 
infrastructure project one that is financially viability, that delivers services efficiently, that targets delivery 
to specific income groups, or that achieves some other goals? 
 
Tenth, how can administrative capacity be built?  The limitations of administrative capacity (including the 
existence of corruption) are routinely identified as a major bottleneck for municipal governments, in 
virtually all dimensions of local government performance.  However, the specific steps that should be 
taken to improve capacity are difficult to identify and complicated to implement.  There is also no attempt 
made to measure systematically the capacity of local government officials or administrators, beyond 
indicators present in such publications as the World Bank’s Doing Business or the World Economic 
Forum’s The Global Competitiveness Report, both of which focus mainly on national considerations of  
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which only a few relate to tax administration and capacity.  Of perhaps more relevance is the recent 
OECD publication Tax Administration n OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries: Comparative 
Information Series (2008), which continues earlier year OECD publications on tax administration.  Again, 
however, these indicators are only available at the national level, and only for a small number of mainly 
developed countries.   There is certainly no understanding of how a lack of capacity affects project 
implementation, beyond the obvious – and true – observation that poor administration makes successful 
project implementation unlikely. 
 
Finally, what are the lessons of “ancient” history on infrastructure finance?  There is an almost irresistible 
tendency to focus on “recent” history in devising infrastructure strategies.  However, governments have 
been building infrastructure for thousands of years.  There is no doubt that circumstances have 
dramatically changed over these years.  Even so, there is no need to ignore the lessons of this history in 
current policy discussions.  Boxes 10 and 11 indicate the richness – and the relevance – of such “ancient” 







th Century Financing of Railroads 
  
Nineteenth-century infrastructure investments included canals, docks, electric power grids, 
sanitation systems, telegraph systems, tramways, and turnpikes, but railways were the most 
prominent and capital-intensive of these investments.  Private participation in financing railroad 
construction was seen then – just as it is seen today – as a way to minimize the inefficiencies of 
public administration, to reduce the financial burden on governments, and to avoid the need for 
external borrowing.  In fact, for much of the nineteenth century infrastructure projects were privately 
financed and built. 
 
According to Eichengreen (1995), however, government intervention continued to be important, 
even with private financing.  The ability of domestic financial markets to underwrite the construction 
of ports, canals, and railways was constrained, in part because of informational asymmetries 
characteristic of markets in the early stages of development.  To help with these problems and to 
attract private investment, lenders turned to financial institutions that specialized in assessing 
projects and monitoring management, typically foreign institutions with foreign clienteles whose 
experience with privately financed projects had given them a head start in raising capital and judging 
risk.  This approach relieved – but did not eliminate – concerns about inadequate information.  
Further, private investment did not reduce the government's involvement or the need for foreign 
borrowing.   Often, however, government intervention simply replaced one set of problems with 
another.  Because of the difficulties of assessing projects, investors were reluctant to commit their 
funds, and governments were often forced to use subsidies and loan guarantees to encourage 
investment.  However, investors with government-guaranteed loans had no incentive to monitor the 
firm's performance, a limitation that led to the diversion of funds and that frustrated the public 
interest.  At the same time, government policies to overcome asymmetric information encouraged 
management to engage in bankruptcy for profit (a problem termed “looting”). 
 
These nineteenth-century failings have implications for current attempts to exploit nontraditional 
approaches to financing infrastructure.  Two further policy initiatives seem necessary, both of which 
necessitate government involvement.  First, efforts should be made to enhance the effectiveness of 
public administration, so that government agencies are responsible for monitoring the efficiency and 
performance of the enterprise, backed by a credible threat of sanctions against managers who are 
tempted to enrich themselves. Second, policymakers need to encourage the development of 
financial institutions and instruments that can surmount information problems and relieve the 
government of the need to provide subsidies and interest guarantees. 
 












The key issues in infrastructure finance are simple to state: 
  How can municipal governments choose the appropriate infrastructure project, including 
coordination across government boundaries? 
  How can they finance it? 
  How can an overall federal structure be created in which incentives – to get the means of 
financing (e.g., pursue intergovernmental transfers simply because the grant money is available, 
pursue borrowing simply because it is believed that the central government will bail out municipal 
governments who cannot repay loans), to maintain the facility (e.g., ignore maintenance simply 
because it is believed that a new facility will be provided by “others”), to use the facility efficiently 
and equitably – are not unduly distorted? 
 
Answering these questions is more difficult.  The process (s) by which finance schemes are actually 
chosen is not well understood.  The process (s) by which facilities can be financed is plagued with 
difficulties and uncertainties.  It seems very unlikely that municipal governments, especially in the poorer 
countries, will be able soon to generate the funds needed to build facilities: they do not have access to 
Box 11: Some Lessons from “Ancient” History: Resource Endowments and the Cost of 
Capital to Brazilian State Governments 
 
What determines the ability of governments to borrow, and to borrow at low cost?  There is a large 
literature that aims to explain what determines “country risk”, defined as the 
difference between the yield of a sovereign‘s bonds and the risk free rate; there is a much smaller 
literature that examines the determinants of risk at the subnational level.  Fritscher and Musacchio 
(2009) argue that an important explanatory factor for the cost of capital in Brazilian state 
governments is the impact that resource endowments have on the capacity of the government to 
pay.  They use a newly created data base with state-level 
fiscal and risk premium data for Brazil states between 1891 and 1930 to show that Brazilian 
states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand 
(e.g., rubber and coffee) ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus lower costs of 
capital.   The variation in revenues per capita was both a product of 
the variation in natural endowments that had differential impacts on the exports of the states and a 
commodity boom that also had asymmetric effects among states. These two effects generated 
variation in revenues per capita at the state level, in part because of the extreme form of fiscal 
decentralization that the Brazilian government adopted in the Constitution of 1891, which gave 
states the sole right to tax exports.  Their estimation results show that the cost of capital for Brazilian 
states and the probability of issuing state debt in international capital markets were highly correlated 
with state revenues per capita. They also find that these variations in the cost of capital had impacts 
on the states’ capacity to issue debt, their access to capital, and their ability to spend on 
infrastructure.   Indeed, Fritscher and Musacchio (2009) conclude that the setup of the 1891 
Constitution promoted some of the regional inequality that is still present today in Brazil. 
 
After 1928 Brazilian states defaulted en masse, and the federal government had to assume all state 
debts, which led to the end of state debt issues in international markets.  By 1934 a new constitution 
was drafted, and in 1937 Getulio Vargas rewrote the constitution to give the central government 
more powers, including a new fiscal setup that destroyed the federalist pact of 1891-1930.  
 
Source: Fritscher and Musacchio (2009).  
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capital markets, and they seldom generate significant revenues on their own (e.g., the property tax is 
unproductive, cost recovery is poor, access to productive revenue sources is limited).  The money must 
therefore come from elsewhere: transfers, private partnerships, privatization, or use of local government 
assets.  Even so, the immediate prospects for significant funding of infrastructure seem, at best, quite 
cloudy.  The process (s) by which incentives can be improved is also difficult to specify.  Moral hazard 
problems abound, especially on municipal borrowing and on their maintenance of facilities. 
 
Given these considerations, my basic conclusions are somewhat pessimistic.  As summarized earlier, 
these conclusions are: 
  The “theory” of fiscal federalism has many useful and general guidelines, but the practical and 
specific relevance of these guidelines remains quite limited. 
  In the specific context of municipal infrastructure finance, there is little in the theory that allows 
one to determine whether one infrastructure “scheme” is “better” than another, whether one 
scheme will be selected in one scenario and not in another, whether one scheme will “work” in 
one scenario and not in another, and the like. 
  There are in fact numerous examples where one infrastructure scheme “works” in one 
institutional setting and not in another, seemingly similar setting.  There are also numerous 
examples where countries with seemingly similar institutional settings follow very different paths 
in infrastructure finance.  
  The reasons for these differential outcomes are unclear.  Clearly, the often-poor administrative 
capabilities (including corruption) of municipal government employees are a factor, but other 
factors seem relevant as well. 
  The full effects of different schemes – on service delivery, on income distribution, on poverty 
reduction, and so on – are seldom fully quantified or understood. 
  The extent of municipal infrastructure finance seems quite limited – a result that parallels the 
limited extent of municipal revenue mobilization more generally, especially from “conventional” 
sources (e.g., taxes, user charges) – and it seems unlikely that this can and will be changed 
quickly, if at all. 
  In large part, the reasons for the lack of clarity of many of these issues relate to limitations on the 
availability of basic information: data problems are serious and endemic. 
 
Despite this pessimism, however, I believe that are potentially productive avenues by which our 
understanding of infrastructure schemes can be enhanced.  These avenues include the following types of 
research activities, which build upon but which also go beyond the discussion of “Some ‘Gaps’ in Our 
Understanding” in the previous section: 
 
1.  Generating more reliable data on various dimensions of infrastructure finance.  It is especially 
important to have basic information on such items as the extent of municipal infrastructure spending 
and the extent of local government assets, generated via a uniform methodology that allows cross-
sectoral, cross-country, and multi-year comparisons of municipality behavior to be made.  Such basic 
information is currently unavailable. 
 
2.  Developing data on administrative capacities of local governments.  As noted earlier, the OECD has 
recently begun compiling information for mainly OECD countries on various aspects of the quality of 
central government tax administration.  A similar effort for major municipalities around the world 
would allow more accurate assessments of administrative capabilities of these governments. 
 
3.  Incorporating recent approaches to valuing risky investments in project appraisal.  Modern finance 
theory has made important innovations in evaluating private investment projects.  These innovations 
may provide useful insights in evaluating public projects, or social benefit-cost analysis. 
 
4.  Incorporating institutional factors, including political elements, in analyses.  There is little question that 
the institutional context, especially local governance, affects the success or failure of infrastructure 




5.  Recognizing the role of non-for-profit organizations in service delivery.  The importance of civic 
society organizations in services is increasing recognized but insufficiently understood.  Do these 
organizations crowd out municipally provided services, as financially strapped local governments opt 
out of services in sectors in which they believe not-for-profit organizations operate?  Or do not-for-
profit organizations act as a complement to municipal government services? 
 
In sum, let me return to and emphasize a common theme throughout: our “theories” provide some 
general guidance on how to provide infrastructure but little specific advice on the mechanics of 
infrastructure provision.  In fact, Slack (2007) believes that, in a fundamental sense, economics plays little 
role in many of these actual decisions: 
 
“… rarely are these economic principles used to determine the optimal government structure.  
More often, the structures that are imposed are dictated by politics, and not economics.   
 
This does not mean, I believe, that our theories – in this domain and elsewhere – are not useful: they 
provide a necessary framework in which we can think about these issues, and they also often allow us to 
identify specific policies that are clearly inconsistent with our theories and whose implementation would 
clearly lead to inefficiencies and inequities.  However, practical implementation requires that we also 
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